



MEMORAHUM FOR MR. MEGRORGE BUMBY THE WHITE BOUSE

Subject: Soviet Intentions Towards Berlin and Germany Reflected in the Rusk-Gromyko Conversations of July 21 and 22

Enclosed are two copies of an INE assessment of the Rask-Gromyko conversations of July 21 and 22.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

July 24 1962

SUBJECT:

Soviet Intentions with Respect to Berlin and Germ Reflected in Gromyko's Remarks to the Secretary July 21 and 22.

The course of the discussion at the Secretary's meetings with Gromyko on July 21 and 22, and particularly the contents of Gromyko's prepared statement of July 21, confirm our expectation of a Soviet effort at this time t increase pressure on the West over Berlin.

Soviets Still Undecided

We see no indication that the Soviets have as yet made a firm decision to proceed with a separate peace treaty. By increased pressure and threats. the Soviets may be seeking to induce some allies of the U.S. to advocate a less firm Western position. The Soviets are also seeking to elicit Western concessions toward an agreed Berlin settlement, or if such a settlement proves impossible, to ascertain what steps can be taken to implement a separate peace treaty without major risk of war. The Soviets do not yet appear to have abandoned hope of obtaining an agreed settlement.

Possible Separate Treaty

Recent Soviet public utterances as well as Gromyko's statement represent possible preparation for conclusion of a separate peace treaty. We assume that the Soviets do not want to proceed with a separate peace treaty which would be an obvious sham, i.e., lacking the consequences which the Soviets have been promising, namely turnover to the GDR of control of access to West Berlin. However, we believe that there is a range of possibilities open to the Soviets for a scaled-down or step-by-step implementation of a peace treaty. From recent statements it appears that the Soviets have been thinking in these terms, but apparently have neither decided on a peace treaty nor as yet decided precisely how a separate peace treaty might be implemented safely from the Soviet standpoint.

Break Avoided

While talking tough and concentrating on the unnegotiable issue of Western troop presence, Gromyko has thus far been careful to avoid suggesting

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that a break in the faller was imminent. Insisting on the troop issue could be a device for preparing a breakdown in the talks, if Moscov decided to go ahead with a separate treaty. However, Crowko has not attempted to set any deadline in restating the Soviet threat to sign a separate peace treaty, and we are struck by the fact that in his July 21 talk he referred to the Soviet proposal on civilian access. While the proposal is an unacceptable one, Gromyko's reference to it suggests that he is leaving himself room for maneuver. It affords him an opportunity to prolong the talks by moving from the troop issue to new consideration of the question of access and demands for some GRR role in the control over access.

Troop Issue Not Exhausted

The Soviets apparently have not exhausted the issue of Western troop presence, and there are additional variants to its proposals for stationing troops in West Berlin under a UN umbrella which Moscow may use in an attempt to draw the US into a discussion of troop presence.